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This paper explores the role played by the production and use of knowledge about international migration 
– or to be more specific the incompleteness of such knowledge –in driving new forms of EU migration gover-
nance. The focus is on the transformation of modes of governance linked to the roles played by instrumen-
tal, social and communicative logics of institutional action. The paper shows that, while the key referent 
for migration governance in Europe remains the state and associated state-centered logics of control, it 
is now evident that both the understanding of the issues and the pursuit of policy objectives are clearly 
shaped by the EU. A key reason for this is the role played by uncertainty related not only to the causes and 
effects of international migration, but also about the actual numbers of international migrants living both 
regularly and irregularly in EU member states. In contrast to existing approaches that see uncertainty and 
incomplete knowledge as causes of policy failure, this paper sees uncertainty and incomplete knowledge 
as creating social and political opportunities for EU action linked to the quest for more and ‘better’ knowl-
edge with resultant conceptual and practical space for ‘transgovernmental’ relations among government 
units working across borders.
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1. Introduction1
This paper develops a practice-based account of the transformation of European migration governance. It 
asks what role the production and use of knowledge about international migration – or to be more specific 
the incompleteness of such knowledge – plays in driving new forms of EU migration governance. The 
focus is not on migration flows, but on the transformation of modes of governance linked to instrumental, 
social and communicative logics of institutional action. This is an important issue because sense-making 
processes within governance systems play a key role in defining the ‘problem’ to be addressed and thus 
shaping the response. The paper shows that, while the key referent for migration governance in Europe 
remains the state and associated state-centered logics of control, it is now evident that both the under-
standing of the issues and the pursuit of policy objectives are clearly shaped by the EU. A key reason for this 
is the role played by uncertainty related not only to the causes and effects of international migration, but 
also about the actual numbers of international migrants living both regularly and irregularly in EU member 
states. While EU governments profess their desire to regulate and control international migration, they 
have incomplete knowledge of both the structure and scale of the issue. In contrast to existing approaches, 
instead of uncertainty and incomplete knowledge being understood as causes of policy failure, this paper 
sees uncertainty as creating social and political opportunities for EU action linked to the quest for more and 
‘better’ knowledge. The result is the creation of conceptual and practical space for ‘transgovernmentalism’, 
i.e. ‘pattern[s] of regular and purposive relations among like government units working across the bor-
ders that divide countries from one another and that demarcate the “domestic” from the “international” 
sphere’ (Slaughter 2004: 14).
The focus for this practice-based account of EU migration governance is the ‘social containers’ that bring 
political elites together in joint enterprises within which there is extensive mutual engagement that can 
lead to the development of a shared repertoire of resources such as data and underlying research (Wenger 
2010). This paper shows how and with what effects a social definition of learning centered on interaction 
and engagement is a core component of the operation and effects of a ‘community of practice’ within which 
the competence and personal experience of participants has created a shared domains of interests, joint 
activities, discussions, information-sharing and a shared repertoire of resources. To illustrate these points 
the paper assesses the role, activities and effects of the European Migration Network (EMN) comprised by 
primarily state actors within which there is extensive information exchange and knowledge sharing. 
2. Diffusion and Convergence
Knowing, the production of knowledge and its use can be understood as acts of participation in social 
learning systems grounded in social structures (Wenger 1998: 226). Alvesson and Spicer (2012: 1195) write 
that ‘one of the central leitmotifs of contemporary organization theory [is that organizations] thrive on 
the basis of their knowledge’. In organizational theory, knowledge is often not clearly defined with the 
result that definitions can be ‘vague and all-embracing’ (Alvesson/Spicer 2012: 1195). In the context of the 
1 Research for this paper was supported by the Volkswagen Stiftung funded project ‘Science-Society Dialogues on 
Migrant Integration in Europe’ (co-ordinated by Erasmus University Rotterdam) and by a visiting fellowship at the 
Kolleg-Forschergruppe ‘The Transformative Power of Europe’, Free University of Berlin, June-July 2012.
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relationship between learning and public policy, a distinction has been made between ‘lay’ and ‘profes-
sional’ knowledge, although as Radaelli (1995: 161) notes ‘the latter (professional knowledge) should not 
necessarily be considered as playing a pivotal or superior role’ as there are ‘reciprocal influences between 
the two, with social science as an aid, refiner, extender or tester of lay knowledge’.
The ‘migration problem’ in contemporary Europe is continuously structured and restructured by ideas 
and discussions, including reflections on the effectiveness of previous and existing approaches, as well 
as approaches in other parts of the world. These ideas and discussions can be understood as the attempt 
to develop ‘stories’ that construct causality in a way that is convincing (Stone 1988). A common narrative 
construction of the migration issue is to represent it as a threat both to the territorial border of European 
countries, but also to key organizational boundaries, such as those of the labor market and welfare state 
(Geddes 2005). Alternative constructions point to the economic benefits of migration or develop rights-
based accounts linked, for example, to people fleeing persecution and seeking refuge. 
Knowledge, its meaning, its use and the quest for ‘more’ or ‘better’ knowledge are central to the social 
processes that underpin inter-state co-operation on international migration in Europe (Boswell 2009; 
Boswell et al. 2011). The production, use and misuse of knowledge have been identified as playing a role 
in policy failure. This could mean the inability to produce the ‘right’ knowledge or to use effectively the 
knowledge that is produced (Castles 2004). EU institutions, particularly the Commission, have long been 
seen as reliant on expertise and the mobilization of knowledge (see, for example, Zito/Schout 2009). The 
most common and, in a sense, neutral use of knowledge is to inform the policy process and contribute to 
‘evidence-based policy-making’. However, as Little (2012: 3) notes, evidence can be highly contested while 
‘policy design, implementation and evaluation are bound up with a number of other contingent factors (…) 
such as the structure of power, the politics of influence and judgments about the contextual constraints 
in any policy environment’ [all of which] have a direct bearing on whether the policies that are actually 
pursued are grounded in evidence or whether the evidence is manufactured to suit the policy agenda’. 
The instrumental view of the role of knowledge (evidence-based policy-making) can be supplemented by 
two other potential uses of knowledge. The first is to legitimate institutional roles by adding epistemic 
authority to policy choices while the second is to substantiate existing policy choices (Boswell 2009; see 
also Feldman/March 1981). 
The EU is a new arena within which knowledge of and about international migration is gathered and dif-
fused. Diffusion has been defined as ‘a process through which ideas, normative standards (…) policies and 
institutions spread across time and space’ (Börzel/Risse 2012: 5). How they spread is the key issue. Four 
mechanisms have been identified, each underpinned by a different (although not mutually exclusive) so-
cial logic. Coercion can take the form of a requirement to conform to EU law as a condition of membership 
or future membership. Manipulation of utility calculations can provide negative and positive incentives, 
such as financial and technical support. These are both informed by an instrumental rationality and by a 
consequential institutional logic. In contrast measures that change the interests and identities of actors 
as a result of interaction mean that the EU could become a ‘gigantic socialisation agency’, which fits with 
a normative institutional logic of appropriateness (Börzel/Risse 2012: 7). Communicative logics can arise 
when member states try to persuade each other about the precepts, principles and practices that should 
inform institutional and policy development. 
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These behavioral logics are not incompatible. Clearly there has been accommodation of member state 
preferences and interests at EU level both in formal structures, but also more informally dating back to the 
1970s. These formal and informal structures were dominated by state actors from interior ministries and 
security agencies with powerful effects and legacies on the relationship between power and knowledge 
in EU migration governance. Another way of thinking about these interactions is to understand them as 
forging an ‘elite consensus’, as will be discussed more fully later. 
Diffusion could also contribute to elements of policy convergence, which can be understood as: ‘any in-
crease in the similarity between one or more characteristics of a certain policy (e.g. policy objectives, policy 
instruments, policy settings) across a given set of political jurisdictions (supranational institutions, states, 
regions, local authorities) over a given period of time. Policy convergence thus describes the end result of a 
process of policy change over time towards some common point, regardless of the causal processes’ (Knill 
2005: 5). This definition of convergence leaves scope for a variety of processes across governance levels to 
drive convergence and for a range of possible convergence outcomes. Convergence can take three main 
forms: decreased variation between states leading to ‘an inverse relationship between the initial value of 
a particular policy indicator and its subsequent growth rate or change’ (Starke et al. 2008: 980); in relation 
to an exemplary model, such as the EU Treaty framework; and, as a result of changes in country rankings 
such as benchmarking exercises and indicators. 
There is limited work on diffusion and on cross-national policy convergence in the area of migration gover-
nance with a tendency to focus on a ‘horizontal’ rationale linked to the characteristics of politics and policy 
in the major destination states and a strong focus on instrumental logics of behavior. For example, a conver-
gence thesis was developed by Cornelius et al. (1994; updated as Cornelius et al. 2004) in which a persistent 
gap at state level in major destination countries in Europe and North America is identified between con-
trol-oriented rhetoric and policy outcomes that are more liberal both in terms of the numbers of migrants 
admitted and legal frameworks. No significant role in this ‘gap hypothesis’ was attributed to supranational 
governance. Similarly, Freeman (1995) identified cross-national convergence in liberal democratic destina-
tion states with migration policy outcomes that are more liberal in terms of both numbers admitted and 
policies than public attitudes to migration suggest would be the case. This was attributed to the underlying 
influence on policy in liberal democracies of pro-migration interest groups, particularly the business lobby. 
Freeman further specified this approach to account for variation in degrees on openness and closure for 
different migration types, such as labor migrants, family migrants and asylum seekers (Freeman 2006). For 
Freeman, the characteristic features of liberal democracy led to the diffusion of ideas, institutions and pol-
icies to induce convergence. Others similarly identify key characteristic features in the constitutive identity 
of liberal states qua liberal states as a factor leading to similar kinds of observed outcomes in the area of 
migration governance. For example, influential accounts have identified the role of national courts, ‘rights 
based politics’ and ‘self-limited’ sovereignty (Hollifield 1992; Joppke 1998). The embeddedness at national 
level of migration policy has also been a key theme. For example, Hansen (2002) identified nationally em-
bedded path dependencies linked to particular kinds of migration flow (such as guestworker recruitment in 
Germany or post-colonial migration to the UK) and the governance structures that enabled them. 
Those who do look at the EU level tend to be skeptical of its scope for the transformation of migration gov-
ernance. For example, Cerna (2009) constructs a high skilled migration index to show continued divergence 
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between OECD states in their high skilled migration policies because of divergent preferences and differing 
domestic political and institutional contexts. She then expresses doubt about the possibility for realising 
a common EU approach to labor migration beyond the weak co-ordination introduced by the so-called 
‘Blue Card’ directive, which merely seeks to ‘approximate’ member state laws on the admission of highly 
qualified people and has no say on the numbers of highly qualified migrants to be admitted. 
The common denominator in all of these accounts is the limited role ascribed to the EU because of the 
continued centrality of the state as the organizing factor in contemporary migration governance. By defi-
nition, this observation is correct. Without states, there would be no such thing as international migration 
because it is states and their borders that make international migration visible as a distinct social and 
political process (Zolberg 1989). However, European integration changes border relationships within and 
between EU member states. This has also created space for the transformation of migration governance 
as the quest for more and better knowledge about international migration has acquired an EU dimension 
with effects on both diffusion and on the scope for elements of convergence in responses to international 
migration in EU member states. 
3. The Development of EU Migration Governance
In order to understand the role played by instrumental, social and communicative logics associated with 
the production and use of knowledge in regional migration governance in Europe, it is necessary to identify 
some of the key underlying dynamics and to consider explanations for these developments. A powerful 
and insightful body of work emerged in the late 1990s to explain the development of EU co-operation 
on migration and asylum. This saw the EU as a largely intergovernmental ‘venue’ to which actors located 
largely within the executive branches of national governments would ‘escape’ in order to circumvent do-
mestic constraints on their ability to impose tough controls on immigration and to refine these restrictive 
approaches (Guiraudon 2000). This work was done in the late 1990s, but since then the scope and effects 
of European integration have been more deeply institutionalized with scope for more powerful effects on 
migration governance. Since the Amsterdam Treaty (1999), it has been possible to speak of a common EU 
migration and asylum policy with significant development of institutional roles and policy. 
3.1 Institutional Development 
Since the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 there has been a common EU migration and asylum policy covering 
some but not all aspects of policy accompanied by the extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) to 
Council decision-making, co-decision to the European Parliament and a full role to the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU). The CJEU no longer has to wait for a reference from the highest court in a 
member state and can act on ‘preliminary references’ with the result that an EU rule of law has begun to 
emerge in the area of migration policy and has been applied to areas such as expulsion, family reunifica-
tion and integration (Acosta/Geddes 2013). The CJEU is thus ‘manifestly neither master nor servant of the 
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member states’ (Garrett et al. 1998: 174-5), but its weight is - and will increasingly be - ‘felt at all levels of 
the decision-making process’ (Dehousse 1998: 177). However, there is an important caveat. Article 79(5) 
of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) affirmed that any EU-level measures on migration ‘do not affect the right of 
member states to determine volumes of admission of TCNs [Third Country Nationals] coming from third 
countries to their territory in order to seek work, whether employed or self-employed’ (Article 79(5)). This 
means that the core business of migration policy – numbers of people to be admitted – is not a matter for 
the EU. But, this does not exclude the EU from a wide range of other aspects of policy, such as family reuni-
fication, measures affecting the rights of long-term residents, asylum and expulsion (all discussed below). 
The accommodation of the preferences of member states at EU level has been facilitated by flexibility in 
the Treaty framework. Flexibility has allowed member states to opt in or out of Treaty provisions or to seek 
derogation from specific aspects of legislative measures. This could be seen as leading to fragmentation. 
Flexibility is ‘a political rather than a legal concept’ (Papagianni 2001: 127) and a potentially least-worst 
solution to the practical problems of co-operation and integration in contentious areas that has been 
particularly evident in areas defined as related to internal security, including migration. In such circum-
stances, flexibility is consistent with established norms and practices rather than a deviation from them. 
The Amsterdam Treaty formalized provisions for ‘closer co-operation’, which was ‘the price to pay’ for the 
agreement to proceed with the objective specified by the Single European Act (SEA) of creating an area 
without internal frontiers within which there was to be free movement of people (Papagianni 2001: 111). 
The most obvious manifestation of flexibility is the Danish, Irish and UK position in relation to Schengen and 
to Title IV of the Amsterdam Treaty. Denmark, for example is a Schengen member state but opted out of 
Amsterdam’s Title IV provisions covering free movement, immigration and asylum. Ireland and the UK are 
not Schengen member states but can opt back in to measures that they support. Flexibility is a political de-
vice to accommodate diversity. It could be construed as a threat to the ‘traditional Community model’, but 
actually creates the possibility for attainment of objectives in areas of ‘high politics’ while also providing 
scope for the reluctant and recalcitrant to opt-in to those measures they feel able to support. Those that 
are ‘out’ can still use negotiations and derogations to define their position in relation to agreed measures 
and still adapt to new EU legislation (Adler-Nissen 2009: 69).
3.2 Policy Development 
There is now a common EU migration and asylum policy, although a key omission is competence related to 
the number of migrants to be admitted, which is a matter for the member states. That said, the directive 
on the recruitment of highly qualified workers (the so-called ‘Blue Card’) provides a very limited foothold 
in this policy area. The Commission is also seeking to extend this co-ordination on a sectoral basis with pro-
posals on seasonal migration and intra-corporate transferees. There has been a much stronger focus in EU 
migration policy on constraining or blocking flows defined by state policies as unwanted. The EU’s self-de-
clared ‘fight against irregular migration’ has had a strong focus on external frontier control and has sought 
to make it more difficult for migrants – including those fleeing persecution - to enter the territory of an EU 
member state. The EU’s rhetorical commitment to the ‘fight against irregular migration’ is closely linked to 
EU enlargement to central, eastern and southern countries with linked attempts to strengthen operational 
capacity through creation of the EU border control agency, Frontex. Implementation does, however, remain 
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primarily a national responsibility. The Returns (i.e. expulsion) directive of 2008 institutionalized a common 
EU approach to expulsion that was widely criticized for its restrictive aspects. However, subsequent CJEU 
interventions have challenged the implementation of the directive, most notably in the case of Italy. Acosta 
and Geddes (2013) argue that the EU level can now provide a check on member state governments whose 
actions are deemed excessive in relation to the provisions of EU law. This doesn’t mean that member states 
can no longer expel people, but it does mean, for example, that imprisonment of irregular migrants can be 
judged as inconsistent with the provisions of directive that seeks return. 
Asylum is probably the most highly developed area of EU migration policy. A series of directives in the early 
2000s laid down minimum standards in areas such as procedures, qualifications and reception conditions. 
More recently, the empowerment of the CJEU to act in this area by the Lisbon Treaty has seen decisions 
that limit the ability of states to return asylum-seekers to their first country of entry – a key principle of the 
one-stop system for asylum put in place by the ‘Dublin II’ regulation of 2004. 
EU action on family migration has created pressure for newer immigration countries in central, eastern and 
southern Europe for a leveling up of standards (Migration Policy Group 2011). The family reunion directive 
(2003/86/EC) determined the right to family reunification of TCNs who reside lawfully in the territory of an 
EU Member State; conditions under which family members can enter and reside in a Member State; and 
rights of the family members once the application for family reunification has been accepted regarding, 
for example, education and training. The directive also recognized the rights of member states to impose 
conditions on family migration and gives them margin to do so in relation to factors such as the definition 
of the family, waiting periods and ‘integration measures’. This negotiation was riddled with compromises 
because it potentially impacted upon admissions policy.  
In 2003, a directive covering migrants with legal residence in an EU member state grants rights equivalent 
to EU citizens after 5 years of legal and continuous residence and allows those who qualify for this status 
to move from one member state to another while maintaining their rights and benefits. Once the status of 
long-term residence is acquired then there is a right to equal treatment on the same basis as EU citizens, 
meaning: access to employment and self-employed activity; education and vocational training; recognition 
of professional qualifications; social security, social protection and social assistance as defined by national 
law; tax benefits; access to goods and services, including housing; and freedom of association, affiliation 
and membership, including trade union membership. The directive also specifies that member states 
may require third country nationals to comply with integration measures, in accordance with national law, 
which may include language courses. 
Integration policies concern themselves with adaptation by migrant newcomers and host societies to the 
effects of immigration. Policy frameworks across the EU are highly diverse and typically linked to traditions 
of nationality and citizenship, i.e. embedded at national level and often also salient in domestic politics. 
Formally, integration policies remain a matter for the member states, but the EU has also adopted some 
legally binding and also ‘softer’, non-binding governance mechanisms. Binding measures include two an-
ti-discrimination directives agreed in June and November 2001 (2000/43/EC Racial Equality directive and 
2000/78/EC Employment Equality directive) that applied to TCNs and were significantly rights-enhancing 
in that they went far beyond measures in most member states. The directives implement the principle 
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of equal treatment for all people, irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. They represent a significant lev-
eling-up through their focus on civil remedies for both direct and indirect discrimination. They provide 
for protection against direct and indirect discrimination in employment and training, education, social 
protection (including social security and health care), social advantages, membership and involvement in 
organizations of workers and employees, and access to goods and services including housing. They cover 
EU citizens and legally-resident TCNs. 
In summary, there are EU measures that embody both more and less formal migration governance en-
compassing action on irregular migration, asylum, family reunion, the rights of third country nationals, 
anti-discrimination directives and, more tentatively, attempts to co-ordinate admissions policies for the 
highly qualified. These have been accompanied by significant institutional development with application 
of the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP) and the extension of full competencies in the area of migration 
policy to the CJEU. While there is a strong restrictive component to these measures, it is also the case that 
they do not all point in the same restrictive, exclusive and repressive ‘fortress Europe’. Some EU measures 
extend rights to legally resident third country nationals while in some areas of policy it has been argued 
that there has been a leveling up rather than the pursuit of the lowest common denominator. The key point 
in the context of the analysis that follows is that all these areas have also been the subject for interaction 
within the EMN. Not only is the EU engaged in a quest for competence, but has also been engaged in the 
development of information and knowledge for and about migration. 
4.  The Drivers of Diffusion 
In order to specify the conceptual and practical space for transgovernmentalism, the paper now moves on 
to identify the operation and effects of four potential drivers of European migration governance. In Figure 1, 
below, a horizontal axis counterposes tendencies towards structure and agency with the structural dimen-
sion postulating external pressures on states to adapt while agency places more emphasis on the ability of 
states or particular communities of actors within states to choose amongst multiple policies. A vertical axis 
counterposes material and ideational factors. Material factors center on the ways in which migration flows 
are seen to affect the economies and security of member states. Ideational factors center on the ways in 
which states ‘alter institutions and regulations because a set of beliefs has developed sufficient normative 
power that leaders fear looking like laggards if they do not adopt similar policies’ (Drezner 2001: 56). Figure 
1 creates space for four underlying dynamics that highlight the roles played by instrumental, social and 
communicative behavioral logics. 
12 | KFG Working Paper No. 56 | November 2013 
Figure 1: Drivers of EU-Wide Policy Convergence in Migration Governance
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 Source: adapted from Drezner, 2001.
Each of the quadrants in Figure 1 represents a potential outcome arising from the relationship between 
structural/agential and material/ideational factors as potential drivers of institutional and policy diffusion. 
A common, underlying point to each of the quadrants is that the EU reduces transaction costs between 
states, but with very different implications for governance modes.  
The top left quadrant can be understood as a race to the bottom or lowest common denominator, i.e., ‘a 
positive theory of regulation with strong normative disapproval of the predicted outcome’ (Drezner 2001: 
57) typically associated with exclusive and repressive policies and ‘fortress Europe’. 
The upper right quadrant combines agency and material factors to generate what is labeled as ‘walls and 
doors’. The reference to walls and doors derives from the insight provided by Zolberg (1989) who argues 
that for advanced, capitalist democracies the core dilemma of migration policy is how high to build the 
walls to exclude those migrants defined by their polices as ‘unwanted’ and how wide to open the doors 
in those walls for flows of privileged migrants, such as the highly qualified. European integration does not 
change the nature of this underlying dilemma, but does create new ways of addressing it and pursuing 
EU-level approaches geared to this relationship between exclusion for the many and inclusion for the few. 
EU migration governance occurs in the shadow of hierarchy as a result of embedded regulatory modes 
embedded in historical and political frameworks at member state level that constrain actors and action 
at EU level. However, when compared to the upper left quadrant, there is a more complex setting at EU 
level with a greater number of possible policy outcomes, some of which may be more ‘open’ in terms of 
soliciting certain types of immigration.  
In the lower left quadrant there is interplay between ideas and structures that can be labeled as the ‘world 
society’ account that focuses on ‘worldwide models constructed and propagated through global cultural 
and associational processes’ (Meyer et al. 1997: 144-5). In this quadrant, structure dominates agency as 
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pressures develop for states to conform with an ideal of the rationalized bureaucratic state. Evidence for 
this could be seen through development of a global scientific discourse, the growth of international orga-
nizations and mimetic adaptation of the migration policies of successful states. 
The lower right quadrant specifies interplay between ideas and agency and is labeled ‘elite consensus’, 
which can also be understood as the space for transgovernmentalism with significant scope for social and 
communicative logics and the development of a relational story of convergence based on interdependence 
and perception of policy externalities (Drezner 2001: 63). Here, there is an important role for uncertainty 
and which then provides a central role to the production and use of knowledge, as well as to a quest for 
‘more’ or ‘better’ knowledge. Uncertainty can play a key role in the constitution of networks of policy ex-
perts sharing ‘common principled beliefs over ends, causal beliefs over means and common standards of 
accruing and testing new knowledge’ (Drezner 2001: 63, see also Haas 1992). The use of expertise (such 
as academic research) can play an instrumental role in satisfying the demand for more knowledge, but can 
also legitimate institutional roles and substantiate existing policy choices (Boswell 2008, 2009; Boswell et 
al. 2011). 
There is a powerful contrast between the left and right-hand side of Figure 1. The left-hand side - ‘fortress 
Europe’ and ‘world society’ - provides stronger, more positive theories of diffusion and scope for conver-
gence with little scope for agency. However, the evidence presented in this paper will show that these pro-
vide less plausible accounts when placed alongside the more complex processes and outcomes associated 
with the right-hand side of the diagram and the relationship between hierarchical, state-centered dynamic 
in the top-right quadrant and elite consensus. 
 5. Elite Consensus and the Transgovernmental Migration Governance
This section specifies how the production and use of knowledge about international migration, the con-
testation of this knowledge and its necessary incompleteness have all played a role in institutional and 
policy diffusion and thus contributed to the transformation of European migration governance. There are 
a wide range of ways in which the EU gathers data and develops the research base for policy. This includes 
research and data collection that occur within the EU, such as Eurobarometer or Eurostat data, as well 
as applied research linked to particular units within the EU or the funding of academic research with an 
applied component, such as through the Framework 7 program. For example, the EU has been interested in 
the role that temporary and circular migration could play in new approaches to labour migration. There has 
been debate at EU level about this. In 2013, funding was made available within the Framework 7 funding 
mechanism to support academic research into a series of issues that reflected this policy agenda. 
The case of the EMN is now used to demonstrate the social basis for policy learning at EU level and to 
illustrate how elite consensus as a driver of institutional and policy diffusion creates the space for a prac-
tice-based account of migration governance that has the incompleteness of knowledge and the quest for 
more and better knowledge at its core. 
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A ‘practice turn’ in international relations has been reflected in recent work on the EU that explores at 
both the general and more specific level the development and effects of communities of practice (see, for 
example, Adler 2009; Bicchi 2011). Communities of practice are ‘groups of people who share a concern or 
a passion for something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact regularly’ (Wenger 2010: 
1). Participating in a community of practice is an essential element of learning as such communities are 
the ‘social containers’ that bring people together with a sense of joint enterprise, mutual engagement 
and a shared repertoire of communal resources (Wenger 2010: 229). Such communities can reduce uncer-
tainty and can make issues more ‘tractable’, by which is meant manageable, not necessarily that they are 
resolvable. 
The social definition of learning in a community of practice has two components (competence and per-
sonal experience) combining with three modes of belonging (engagement, imagination and alignment). 
Competence is historically and socially defined: ‘To be competent is to be able to engage with the commu-
nity and be trusted as a partner in these interactions’ (Wenger 2010: 229). Competence and experience 
are not necessarily congruent but when they are in close tension and either starts pulling the other then 
learning takes place. The simplest dynamic here would be ‘newer’ member states learning from ‘older’ 
member states as asymmetries in experience can affect the historical and social definition of competence.
The three modes of belonging - engagement, imagination and alignment - are seen as co-existing. 
Engagement involves people working together in ways that can shape experience. An imaginative leap can 
also be required to think of oneself as a member of a community of practice and to see a basis for shared 
membership. This leap may be large if the community is big (a national community) and members do not 
all meet, but is not such a large leap if members do meet on a regular basis (as in the EMN). The third mode 
of belonging is alignment understood as a mutual process of coordinating perspectives that may, at first 
glance, appear quite pluralistic, but will be embedded within social structures that do not evenly distribute 
resources.
The social definition of learning and the modes of belonging are the basis for communities of practice 
that have three characteristics: a shared domain of interest as membership implies a commitment to the 
domain; the existence of a community as evidenced by joint activities, discussions and information shar-
ing; and, a community of practice is a community of practitioners with a shared repertoire of resources. 
Practices develop through problem solving, requests for information, seeking experience, re-using assets, 
co-ordination and synergy, discussing developments, documentation projects, visits, mapping knowledge 
and identifying gaps (Wenger 1998). 
Transgovernmentalism also necessarily implies boundary interactions, understood as exposure to a ‘for-
eign competence’. Within the EMN are various kinds of boundary interaction such as the sharing of infor-
mation about national policy approaches, the development of glossaries of key terminology, the gathering 
of data, the funding of research and requests for information about how things are done in other countries. 
In the EU’s transgovernmental system of migration governance, learning becomes linked to co-ordination 
between communities of practice, transparency in terms of securing access to information about various 
practices; and negotiability, which means making room for multiple voices. Ostensibly, this presents a very 
pluralistic vision of the learning process, although, migration governance is strongly state-centered with a 
powerful shadow cast by hierarchy. 
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To illustrate key features of a practice-based account of European migration governance, Table 1 plots key 
aspects of social learning in a community of practice (CoP) on the left hand side of the table against char-
acteristic features of boundary interaction across the top. 
Table 1: The Space for Transgovernmentalism: Communities of Practice and Boundary 
Interactions
Coordination Transparency Negotiability
Engagement Opportunities for joint 
activities and problem 
solving
Explanation of practices 
to each other to facilitate 
learning
Can multiple perspectives 
meet?
Imagination Understanding of respec-
tive perspectives to pres-
ent effectively and pre-
vent misunderstandings
Artefacts etc that held 
build picture of another 
practice
Do both sides see them-
selves as members of an 
overarching community 
with common interests?
Alignment Can methods etc be inter-
preted into action across 
boundaries?
Are the basis of CoPs clear 
enough to reveal common 
ground?
Who decides when nego-
tiating between CoPs and 
searching for compromise?
Source: Wenger 2010: 235.
Boundary interactions can be stimulated by individuals acting as brokers across boundaries while ‘bound-
ary objects’ such as the development of data and information can also facilitate boundary interactions as 
comparable data can also help to generate a sense of shared meaning (Star/Griesemer 1989). 
The EMN does provide significant evidence of boundary interactions, but there are social and cognitive lim-
its to learning that relate to the ways in which the field is constructed and constituted at EU level. Cognitive 
limitations can, of course, lead to ‘bounded’ or ‘semi-rationality’ (March 1978; Brunsson 2002). In such 
circumstances, a lack of time and resources inhibits knowledge utilization. Along similar lines, Lindblom 
(1959) refers to ‘muddling through’ while the ‘garbage can’ model of decision-making focuses on instability 
in organizational environments with ambiguity preventing people from fully mobilizing their cognitive ca-
pacities and acting rationally (Cohen et al. 1972). Smithson (1989) contends that the problem may be more 
than ignorance, although here again the emphasis is placed not on willfulness, but on a lack of knowledge 
or awareness of where knowledge is located. These perspectives tend to focus on impediments to learning 
such as lack of time and resources. 
This leaves open the question of how power relations may lead to a disinclination to use intellectual re-
sources (Alvesson/Spicer 2012: 1198). There may be circumstances within which organizational settings 
can stifle reflexive capacity with the result that ‘cognitive capacities may be limited by relations of power 
and domination rather than a lack of time and resources, or cognitive fixations’ (Alvesson/Spicer 2012: 
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1196). These amount to more than ‘blocks’ and are labeled as ‘functional stupidity’, i.e., as an inability to 
learn that may actually be functional to organizations because it reduces uncertainty. People may be un-
willing to challenge the assumptions upon which their role and activity are based. This can take the form of 
a lack of reflexivity by not questioning knowledge claims and norms or a lack of justification in not demand-
ing or providing explanations for action. These run counter to the logic of communicative rationality that 
involves giving reasons for actions or behaviour and seeking to justify them. A lack of substantive reasoning 
also means that questions can be framed in narrow ways that might even be misleading (Alvesson/Spicer 
2012: 1196). In such circumstances, ‘functional stupidity is organizationally-supported lack of reflexivity, 
substantive reasoning and justification. It entails a refusal to use intellectual resources outside a narrow 
and ‘safe’ terrain. It can provide a sense of certainty that allows organization to function smoothly. This 
can save the organization and its members from the frictions provoked by doubt and reflection’ (Alvesson/
Spicer 2012: 1196). 
6. The European Migration Network as a Community of Practice
The EMN’s origins were intergovernmental. In 1996, the Commission undertook a feasibility study for the 
creation of a European Migration Observatory, although in the end this was not established. The Laeken 
European Council meeting in October 2001 called for a system of information exchange on migration. In 
2003, the EMN was launched as a pilot project and then as what is known as a ‘Preparatory Action’ be-
tween 2004 and 2006 during which participation was voluntary and the EMN was run from a research cen-
tre in Germany. The first topic for an EMN report was the ambitious question of the Impact of Immigration 
on European Societies. The report was controversial, much delayed and led to a re-evaluation of the EMN’s 
role with a greater emphasis placed on work of a more technical nature (Boswell 2009). 
The Hague Programme for Justice and Home Affairs covering the period 2005-10 included a plan for a 
Green Paper on the future of the EMN. On the basis of the Green Paper the Commission in August 2007 
proposed to the Council the creation of a legal basis for the EMN, which was agreed by Council Decision 
2008/381/EC. The decision to more formally constitute the EMN also gave it a stronger intergovernmental 
base as most of the national correspondents or National Contact Points (NCPs) as they are known are 
based in interior ministries. 
According to the Council Decision the purpose of the EMN ‘is to meet the information needs of Union 
institutions and of Member States’ authorities and institutions on migration and asylum by providing up to 
date, objective, reliable and comparable information on migration and asylum with a view to supporting 
European policy-making in these areas. The EMN will also serve to provide the wider public with such infor-
mation’, by, for example: collecting, exchanging and updating data; analyzing data and providing it in read-
ily accessible forms; contributing to the development of indicators; publishing periodic reports; creating 
and maintaining an internet based information exchange system to provide access to relevant documents. 
The EMN is coordinated by the Commission (DG Home Affairs) which is supported by two private sector 
contractors that assist with the exchange of information and with the development of the technology 
to support interchange. The work is supported by EMN NCPs in all member states (except Denmark, but 
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including Norway) with at least three experts, one of whom is the national coordinator. These are mainly 
from ministries of the interior and justice but also involve research institutes, NGOs and international 
organizations (the International Organization for Migration is the NCP for three member states). The inten-
tion to promote social learning as well as the EMN’s intergovernmental orientation was emphasized by an 
interviewee from an international organization:
There is still a learning and exchange process that comes with that network. There is some kind of net-
work effect to it, it’s hard to put the finger on it, it’s not a network that produces some groundbreaking 
new evidence that changes the course of policies, but that rather informs the policymakers and these 
people largely come from the institutions that also set policy course (…) (Representative of international 
organization, Brussels, March 2013).
Networking within the EMN is intensive and takes various forms:
• Regular meeting of NCPs (twelve in 2009, seven in 2010 and seven in 2011);
• EMN Studies drawing from information from all participants of which there are usually 
three each year;
• An annual EMN conference;
• Training sessions on technical or administrative issues;
• Twinning and collaboration meetings; 
• Studies addressing specific themes;
• Annual reports from all participants that feed into the Commission’s Annual Report on Mi-
gration and Asylum;
• The development of a glossary and thesaurus as the basis for improved comparability to 
develop common understanding of terms with the aim of harmonising policy concepts 
(EMN, Annual Report 2009, 17);
• An information exchange as a repository with a search function;
• Ad Hoc requests.
These Ad Hoc requests are particularly relevant. Of the 400 or so Ad Hoc queries that were made between 
2008 and 2012, more than 260 have been published. Ad Hoc queries are grouped under various headings: 
illegal immigration, return, protection, economic migration, integration, borders, EU acquis, family reunifi-
cation, residence, students, trafficking, visas and a general ‘unclassified’ category. An interviewee from an 
international organisation highlighted the role of Ad Hoc requests as follows:
my impression (…) is that the EMN in particular has become important through its more kind of research 
gathering, the ad hoc queries. There is an enormous amount of queries that are circulated and that are 
requested on a state basis (…) that really has become an important mechanism of policy learning (…) 
Member States who have an interest to make or change a policy on a particular issue, sometimes on 
very specific issues (…) even if it’s just six or seven Member States replying to that, it’s still something 
that you don’t have, or something that individual Member States don’t have the capacity to deliver in 
the same way. It’s much more difficult for individual Member States to use their own contacts (…) to 
get that kind of information in that timeframe (Representative of international organization, Brussels, 
March 2013).
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Two representatives of think tanks both highlighted a strong intergovernmental dynamic, but also the way 
in which the strategic context for national policy-making has changed:
It serves intergovernmental needs because it allows Member States to ask their ad hoc queries (…) 
they are very politically motivated (…) you can match almost every query to a national policy debate or 
national policy process (…) it allows them to then make the comparative claim themselves (…) In the UK 
there was a green paper restricting family reunification, with many proposals (…) and they were then 
using comparisons, you know, saying (…) other countries do this (…) and then they would give certain 
examples. Whereas they only chose very few countries in Europe that do this, not noting that all other 
countries do not do this (Interviewee from Brussels think tank, Brussels, March 2013).
Ad hoc queries are surprisingly useful because they tend to be linked to one particular Member State’s 
deliberations at a given moment (…) last year when the Dutch were thinking about the integration of 
EU citizens, they had an ad hoc query (…) and they got a wealth of information back and it really helped 
them to think through what the key issues were (…) (Interviewee from Brussels think tank, Brussels, 
March 2013).
These ‘regular and purposive relations’ (Slaughter 2004: 14) break down barriers between national policy 
systems and serve as a mechanism for diffusion and convergence. As a NCP put it when referring to the 
EMN country reports:
I am an avid reader of the country reports because (…) I am interested in what works, so those country 
reports are extremely useful. There is a kind of hidden output of those. Are you aware of the informal 
networks? The integration contact points and the responsible authorities for the various funds that we 
manage have a number of informal networks (…) so for example I was in Bratislava back in the spring 
talking very specifically about the funding issues (…) that’s a kind of offshoot of some of the work that’s 
being done. You choose the networks you want to join on the basis of country reports (…) so this partic-
ular network is Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Poland, Netherlands, Austria and the UK (…) looking 
at common factors around the funding of projects. You have the background information from the 
country reports (…) so you can find out what are the similarities or what are the contrasts. We also have 
other informal bilateral relationships which are again informed by the country reports. I talk a lot to my 
opposite numbers in the Netherlands, in Germany, Italy, France on quite specific issues that come out of 
those reports (…) things that we want to follow up on (…) (Interview with EMN NCP, Brussels, June 2013).
The EMN breaks down barriers between national policy systems and changes the strategic context for the 
framing of policy, but there is less to suggest that it recasts or reshapes the fundamental dilemmas that 
shape policy that remain state-centered. It can, however, help with an enhanced understanding of how so-
cial and communicative logics linked to interaction in transgovernmental networks leads to the production 
of knowledge of and about international migration that can legitimate institutional roles and substantiate 
existing policy choices. 
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7.  Conclusions
This paper has argued not only that there is evidence of policy and institutional diffusion leading to some 
elements of convergence in European migration policies, but also that the EU plays a role in determining 
the form that it takes. The transformation that is identified is consistent with interplay between instrumen-
tal, social and communicative logics that highlight both preference accommodation, but the forms of elite 
consensus-building that are enabled by the EU political system. These create the conceptual and practical 
space for transgovernmentalism. 
The paper qualified stronger, more positive accounts of convergence emphasizing either lowest common 
denominator or ‘globalist’ outcomes, which were confounded both by the more varied range of policy 
outputs and by the ways in which specific features of EU migration governance account for both the em-
beddedness of migration policy, but also create new and distinct ways in which common responses can 
develop in areas where there is interdependence. The paper laid particular emphasis on the social context 
for learning and its effects on embedded historical and political frameworks. It also sought to identify 
mechanisms, processes and routinized interactions within which these play out. Emphasis was placed on 
the social context within which knowledge about international migration is produced. It was argued that 
state-centered logic remains to the fore and also suggested cognitive limits linked to the embeddedness of 
national-level approaches. However, it also showed that the context within which thought and reflection 
about migration occurs at official level has changed. Member states now systematically locate their views 
and conceptualizations of international migration and the ‘migration problem’ in an EU context. A key 
underlying explanation for this is the incompleteness of knowledge about international migration and 
the development at EU level mechanisms to gather more complete and ‘better’ knowledge. This amounts 
to a transformation of the ways in which European countries make sense of international migration with 
implications for both the underlying conceptualization of the issues and more empirically-oriented ideas 
about how governance systems should respond.  
20 | KFG Working Paper No. 56 | November 2013 
References
Acosta, Diego/Geddes, Andrew 2013: The development, application and implications of an EU rule of law 
in the area of migration policy, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 51/2, 179-193.
Adler, Emanuel 2009: Europe as a civilizational community of practice, in: Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.): 
Civilisations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives, London: Routledge, 67-90.
Adler-Nissen, Rebecca 2009: Behind the scenes of differentiated integration: circumventing national opt-
outs in Justice and Home Affairs, in: Journal of European Public Policy 16/1, 62-80.
Alvesson, Mats/Spicer, André 2012: A stupidity based theory of organisations, in: Management Studies 
49/7, 1194-1220.
Bicchi, Federica 2011: The European Union as a community of practice: communications in the COREU 
network, in: Journal of European Public Policy 18/8, 1115-1132.
Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas 2012: From Europeanisation to diffusion: Introduction, in: West European 
Politics 35/1, 1-19.
Boswell, Christina 2008: The political functions of expert knowledge: knowledge and legitimation in 
European Union immigration policy, in: Journal of European Public Policy 15/4, 471-488.
Boswell, Christina 2009: The Political Use of Expert Knowledge: Immigration Policy and Social Research, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Boswell, Christina/Geddes, Andrew/Scholten, Peter 2011: States knowledge and narratives of migration: 
the construction of migration in European policy-making, in: British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations 13/1, 1-11.
Brunsson, Nils 2002: The Organization of Hypocrisy: Talk, Decision and Action in Organizations, Copenhagen: 
Copenhagen Business School Press.
Castles, Stephen 2004: Why migration policies fail, in: Ethnic and Racial Studies 27/2, 205-227.
Cerna, Lucie 2009: The varieties of high-skilled immigration policies: coalitions and policy outputs in 
advanced industrial countries, in: Journal of European Public Policy 16/1, 144-161.
Cohen, Michael D./March, James G./Olsen, Johan P. 1972: A garbage can model of organizational choice, 
in: Administrative Science Quarterly 17/1, 1-25.
Cornelius, Wayne/Martin, Philip/Hollifield, James 1994: Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, 
Stanford (CA.): Stanford University Press.
Cornelius, Wayne/Martin, Philip/Tsuda, Takeyuki/Hollifield, James 2004: Controlling Immigration: A Global 
Perspective, second edition, Stanford (CA.): Stanford University Press.
Dehousse, Renaud 1998: The European Court of Justice, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Drezner, Daniel W. 2001: Globalization and policy convergence, in: International Studies Review 3/1, 53-78.
European Migration Network 2009: European Migration Network Status Report 2009, SEC(2010) 1006 
final, Brussels: European Commission.
Feldman, Martha S./March, James G. 1981: Information in organizations as signal and symbol, in: 
Administrative Science Quarterly 26/2, 171-186.
Freeman, Gary P. 1995: Modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states, in: International 
Migration Review 28/4, 881-902.
Freeman, Gary P. 2006: National models, policy types and the politics of immigration in liberal democracies, 
in: West European Politics 29/2, 227-247.
Garrett, Geoffrey/Kelemen, Daniel R./Schulz, Heiner 1998: The European Court of Justice, national 
governments and legal integration in the European Union, in: International Organization 52/1, 
149-176.
The Transformation of European Migration Governance  | 21
Geddes, Andrew 2005: Europe’s border relationships and international migration relations, in: Journal of 
Common Market Studies 43/4, 787-806.
Guiraudon, Virginie 2000: European integration and migration policy: vertical integration as venue 
shopping, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 38/2, 251-271.
Haas, Peter 1992: Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, in: 
International Organization 46/1, 1–35.
Hansen, Randall 2002: Globalization, embedded realism and path dependence: The other immigrants to 
Europe, in: Comparative Political Studies 35/3, 259-283.
Hollifield, James 1992: Immigrants, States and Markets: The Political Economy of Migration in Europe, 
Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press.
Joppke, Christian 1998: Why liberal states accept unwanted immigration, in: World Politics 50/2, 266-293. 
Knill, Christoph 2005: Cross-national policy convergence: concepts, approaches and explanatory factors, 
in: Journal of European Public Policy 12/5, 764-774.
Lindblom, Charles 1959: The science of muddling through, in: Public Administration Review 19/2, 79-88.
Little, Adrian 2012: Political action, error and failure: the epistemological limits of complexity, in: Political 
Studies 60/1, 3-19.
March, James G. 1978: Bounded rationality, ambiguity and the engineering of choice, in: Bell Journal of 
Economics 9/2, 587-608.
Meyer, John W./Boli, John/Thomas, George M./Ramirez, Francisco O. 1997: World society and the nation 
state, in: American Journal of Sociology 103/1, 144-181.
Migration Policy Group 2011: MPG Briefings for the Green paper on Family Reunion, Brussels: Migration 
Policy Group.
Papagianni, Georgia 2001: Flexibility in Justice and Home Affairs: an old phenomenon taking new forms, 
in: de Witte, Bruno/Hanf, Dominik/Vos, Ellen (eds): The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law, 
New York: Intersentia, 101-128
Radaelli, Claudio M. 1995: The role of knowledge in the policy process, in: Journal of European Public 
Policy 2/2, 159-183.
Schout, Adrian/Zito, Anthony 2009: Learning theory reconsidered: EU integration theories and learning, in: 
Journal of European Public Policy 16/8, 1103-1123.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie 2004: A New World Order: Government Networks and the Disaggregated State, 
Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.
Smithson, Michael 1989: Ignorance and Uncertainty: Emerging Paradigms, New York: Springer Verlag.
Star, Susan Leigh/Griesemer, James R. 1989: Institutional ecology, ‘translations’ and boundary objects: 
amateurs and professionals in Berkeley’s museum of vertebrate zoology 1907-39, in: Social 
Studies of Science 19/3, 387-420.
Starke, Peter/Obinger, Herbert/Castles, Francis G. 2008: Convergence towards where: in what ways, if any, 
are welfare states becoming more similar?, in: Journal of European Public Policy 15/7, 975-1000.
Stone, Deborah 1988: Policy Paradox; The Art of Political Decision Making, London: W. W. Norton & 
Company.
Wenger, Etienne 1998: Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning and Identity, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Wenger, Etienne 2010: Communities of Practice and Social Learning Systems: The Career of a Concept, 
London: Springer Verlag.
Zolberg, Aristide R. 1989: The next waves: migration theory for a changing world, in: International 
Migration Review 23/3, 403-430.
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe - Encouraging Academic Exchange and 
Intensive Research
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) is a new funding programme laun-
ched by the German Research Foundation in 2008. It is a centrepie-
ce of the KFG to provide a scientifically stimulating environment in 
which innovative research topics can be dealt with by discourse and 
debate within a small group of senior and junior researchers. 
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe „The Transformative Power of Europe“ 
brings together research on European affairs in the Berlin-Branden-
burg region and institutionalizes the cooperation with other univer-
sities and research institutions. It examines the role of the EU as pro-
moter and recipient of ideas, analyzing the mechanisms and effects 
of internal and external diffusion processes in three research areas:
• Identity and the Public Sphere
• Compliance, Conditionality and Beyond
• Comparative Regionalism and Europe’s External Relations
